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ABSTRACT: In this theme essay for the addressed special-theme section in this special issue
of the journal Comparative Philosophy commemorating the first anniversary of the
International Society for Comparative Philosophy toward World Philosophy (CPWP), I intend
to give an elaboration of the theme “comparative philosophy as a general way of doing
philosophy through cross-tradition engagement toward world philosophy” (‘comparative
philosophy toward world philosophy’ for short), which has been explicitly presented and
formally stated through its recent academic-organizational channel CPWP and focuses on via
the Journal’s and CPWP’s jointly organized international conference. The theme
“comparative philosophy toward world philosophy” as a whole marks a momentous
accumulating point of the significant development of comparative philosophy as a general way
of doing philosophy through cross-tradition engagement regarding its “direction” dimension,
through the constructive-engagement strategy in theoretic exploration and reflective practice
especially since the beginning of this century.
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International Society for Comparative Philosophy toward World Philosophy (CPWP),
I intend to give an elaboration of the theme “comparative philosophy as a general way
of doing philosophy through cross-tradition engagement toward world philosophy”
(‘comparative philosophy toward world philosophy’ for short), which has been
explicitly presented and formally stated through its recent academic-organizational
channel CPWP via its Constitution. Although all of its three dimensions (i.e., its
“character” dimension as “a general way of doing philosophy”, its “approach”
dimension as “cross-tradition engagement”, and its “direction” dimension as “toward
world philosophy”) had been more or less suggested and explained before in an explicit
or implicit way, the theme “comparative philosophy toward world philosophy” as a
whole marks a momentous accumulating point of the significant development of
comparative philosophy (no matter how to label it) as a general way of doing
philosophy through cross-tradition engagement regarding its “direction” dimension,
through the constructive-engagement strategy in theoretic exploration and reflective
practice especially since the beginning of the 21st century. The theme has been
pointedly focused on in a recent international virtual conference (19-23 April 2022) coorganized by this journal and the CPWP and co-sponsored and hosted by the SJSU
Center for Comparative Philosophy.
In the following, my strategy is this. In section 1, I give a general explanation of
the identity of comparative philosophy under examination in this essay, which is
essentially a general way of doing philosophy through cross-tradition engagement
toward world philosophy (whether all of its dimensions are explicitly or implicitly
given, and no matter how it is labeled), as theoretically explored and reflectively
practiced through a range of collective and individual research projects especially since
the beginning of this century and via the journal Comparative Philosophy since 2010.
In section 2, instead of a comprehensive examination of all relevant endeavors, I focus
on one representative “constructive-engagement” strategy of comparative philosophy
as emphasized by this journal and the CPWP, highlighting its emphases; among others,
I explain how its substantial development intrinsically points to a vision of world
philosophy that is a forward-looking, dynamic, and multiple-layered process of
development of philosophy worldwide (thus “toward world philosophy”), which
demands a holistic guidance of adequate methodological guiding principles. In section
3, I explain why and how a holistic command of “adequacy” conditions for maintaining
adequate methodological guiding principles with a higher and broader vision is crucial
both in working out the constructive-engagement strategic account and in guiding the
constructive-engagement-oriented worldwide efforts of comparative philosophy
toward world philosophy. I first briefly present an enhanced version of a holistic
account of “adequacy” conditions for maintaining adequate methodological principles
which constitutes a meta-methodological framework of how cross-tradition
engagement is possible; I then explain how the overall holistic vision of this suggested
meta-methodological framework points to the “direction” dimension of comparative
philosophy as a general way of doing philosophy through cross-tradition engagement
toward world philosophy.
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1. IDENTITY OF COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY
UNDER EXAMINATION
Especially since the beginning of the 21st century, the significance and value of
comparative philosophy (no matter how one would prefer to label it) as a general way
of doing philosophy comparatively (in plain words but in a circular way, or, more
explicitly in a non-circular way, through cross-tradition engagement) has been
recognized and strengthened through both theoretic exploration and reflective practice.
Furthermore, especially in the past decade, the “direction” dimension of comparative
philosophy (as “toward world philosophy”), closely or intrinsically related to its
“nature” dimension (“a general way of doing philosophy”) and its “approach”
dimension (“through cross-tradition engagement”), has been addressed explicitly and
emphatically, as shown by the subtitle of this journal (“Comparative Philosophy: An
International Journal of Constructive Engagement of Distinct Approaches toward
World Philosophy”) since its inception in 2010. Since 2021 when the CPWP was
established in response to a range of genuine needs and challenges especially since the
burst of COVID-19 worldwide,1 the theme “comparative philosophy as a general way
of doing philosophy through cross-tradition engagement toward world philosophy” as
a whole (‘comparative philosophy toward world philosophy’ for short) has been
explicitly presented and formally stated through its recent academic-organizational
channel CPWP via its Constitution document. Although all of its three dimensions (i.e.,
its “character” dimension as “a general way of doing philosophy”, its “approach”
dimension as “cross-tradition engagement”, and its “direction” dimension as “toward
world philosophy” had been more or less suggested and explained before in an explicit
or implicit way, the theme “comparative philosophy toward world philosophy” as a
whole marks a momentous accumulating point of the significant development of
comparative philosophy as a general way of doing philosophy through cross-tradition
engagement regarding its “direction” dimension as well as its character and approach
dimensions.
It is noted that the phrase ‘comparative philosophy’ per se, just like the term
‘philosophy’, is ambiguous and vague; one can choose whichever term/phrase one
would prefer to denote such a general way of doing philosophy through cross-tradition
engagement toward world philosophy. The label ‘comparative philosophy’ is used here
for convenience and with consideration of a certain degree of historical and conceptual
continuity; this can be partially shown by an alternative label ‘doing philosophy
comparatively’, which as cited at the outset can be elaborated in a closely related way
to the idea of “a general way of doing philosophy through cross-tradition engagement
toward world philosophy”. With the “use” and “mention” distinction, we focus on what
the label is “used to talk about”, instead of the “mentioned” linguistic item per se. When
addressing, examining, and emphasizing comparative philosophy understood in such a
philosophically interesting and significant way, this implies neither rejection of (actual
or possible) other specific usages of this linguistic label (at the “mention” level, either
1

See this author’s brief explanation of them in “Editor’s Words” of this issue of the Journal.
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the English phrase ‘comparative philosophy’ in English or its counter parts in other
natural languages) nor indiscriminate denial of what the phrase has been ever used to
stand for (at the “use” level). What is focus on is the nature, approach, and direction of
such a (type of) general way of doing philosophy through cross-tradition engagement
toward world philosophy and its significance and value, rather than mere verbal
disagreement (such as how to use the linguistic label ‘comparative philosophy’, where
the term ‘comparative’ and its cognates in English or in some other natural languages
were from, what are their philological analyses are, etc.). That might be historically or
linguistically interesting for certain other purposes but not what is focused on here.
It is neither accident nor imposed that “comparative philosophy as a general way
of doing philosophy through cross-tradition engagement toward world philosophy”
constitutes the central theme of the addressed international virtual conference event on
comparative philosophy, which was co-organized by the CPWP and this journal and
co-sponsored and hosted by the Center of Comparative Philosophy, SJSU (19-24 April
2022): this is the shared mission and emphasis of the co-sponsoring parties, as
highlighted in their respective constitutional documents.
The “mission” clause of the Constitution of the International Society for
Comparative Philosophy toward World Philosophy (CPWP) states as follows:
The Society aims at: (1) promoting comparative philosophy as a general way of doing
philosophy through cross-tradition engagement toward world philosophy, which seeks
dialogue, mutual understanding and learning, complementarity, and joint contributions by
distinct approaches and resources from different philosophical traditions worldwide for
the sake of the contemporary development of philosophy and society. (2) facilitating
academic exchange and discussion of ideas among interested philosophers in various
regions worldwide and providing them with effective channels and platforms in view of
the foregoing goal.2

The goal of the journal Comparative Philosophy is both briefly highlighted in the
journal subtitle “An International Journal of Constructive Engagement of Distinct
Approaches toward World Philosophy” and stated in its “mission” statement as follows:
Comparative Philosophy is a peer-reviewed, open-access/non-profit international journal
of philosophy, with emphasis on the constructive engagement of distinct approaches to
philosophical issues, problems, themes from different philosophical traditions (whether
distinguished culturally or by style/orientation) for the sake of their joint contribution to
the development of philosophy and of contemporary society, and on general theory and
methodology of comparative philosophy.” 3

The strategic purpose of the Center for Comparative Philosophy, SJSU, is stated in
its Charter as follows:
2

Cited from the CPWP Constitution (approved in May 2021), Clause 2.1, as posted at the CPWP website
<cpwponline.org>. [My italics for emphasis.]
3
Cited from the “About This Journal” (2010) document posted at the Journal website
<www.comparativephilosophy.org>. [My italics for emphasis.]
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It aims at promoting and enhancing the research and scholarship at SJSU in comparative
philosophy (doing philosophy in a cross-tradition engaging way) for the sake of
contributing to the academic mission of SJSU and the international scholarship of
comparative philosophy….Comparative philosophy considers philosophy in a global
context and through the constructive engagement of philosophies from around the globe.
One central concern of comparative philosophy is to inquire into how, via reflective
criticism (including self-criticism) and argumentation and with the guidance of adequate
methodological guiding principle, distinct approaches and resources from different
philosophical traditions (whether distinguished culturally or by style/orientation) can talk
to, engage with and learn from each other and jointly contribute to a range of reflective
issues and topics of philosophical significance and value, which can be jointly concerned
under appropriate philosophical interpretation and from a broader philosophical vantage
point.4

The theme “comparative philosophy [as a general way of doing philosophy through
cross-tradition engagement] toward world philosophy” is open to distinct elaborations
in distinct terms or even with distinct focus on one or more than one of the addressed
three major dimensions, which can be not only compatible literally but also
substantially complementary given that they share the same normative bases of talking
about the same world as a whole and of the truth pursuit (as conceived in, and in
accordance with, people’s pre-theoretic “way-things-are-capturing” understanding of
truth, rather than “anything goes”).5
2. A CONSTRUCTIVE-ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY:
COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY TOWARD WORLD PHILOSOPHY
One representative strategic account of comparative philosophy as a general way of
doing philosophy through cross-tradition engagement toward world philosophy is what
is often or sometimes labeled ‘constructive-engagement strategy’ or ‘constructiveengagement account’, which is (more or less) jointly shared by the co-sponsor parties
of the addressed international conference event. The constructive-engagement strategy
holistically addresses all the three dimensions of comparative philosophy as a general
way of doing philosophy through cross-tradition engagement toward world philosophy,
explicitly or implicitly: i.e., its “nature” dimension as “a general way of doing
philosophy”, its “approach” dimension as “through cross-tradition engagement”, and
its “direction” as “toward world philosophy”. The constructive-engagement strategic
account, generally and briefly speaking, can be summarized in this way:
One strategic goal and methodological strategy of comparative philosophy is to
inquire into how, by way of reflective criticism (including self-criticism) and
4

Cited from the Charter of the Center for Comparative Philosophy, SJSU, which was established in 2007.
[My italics for emphasis.]
5
For a detailed examination of the normative bases for cross-tradition engagement in philosophy, see
chapter 1 of Mou 2020.
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argumentation and with the guidance of adequate methodological guiding
principles, distinct approaches (even though not derivable from or reducible to each
other) from different philosophical traditions (whether distinguished culturally or
by style and orientation) or respectively from some (ancient) philosophical tradition
and contemporary society (‘from different traditions’ for short) can talk to and learn
from each other and jointly contribute (in a complementary way) to the
development of philosophy and of contemporary society on a range of reflective
issues of philosophical (or intellectual) value and significance, which can be jointly
concerned and approached through appropriate philosophical interpretation and
from a broader philosophical vantage point.
The constructive-engagement strategy has six emphases that are closely related. (1)
It emphasizes critical engagement for the sake of truth pursuit (rather than “anything
goes”). (2) It emphasizes constructive joint contribution of distinct approaches in
critical engagement through their learning from each other (through their
reasonable/appropriate parts if any: either eligible perspectives, or adequate guiding
principles, or effective instruments) and making joint contribution to jointly concerned
issues/topics (either actually/explicitly or potentially/implicitly addressed ones6) in a
complementary way. (3) It emphasizes philosophical interpretation of the addressed
thinkers’ texts instead of mere historical descriptions. (4) It emphasizes the
philosophical-issue-engagement orientation that aims at contribution to the
contemporary development of philosophy on a range of philosophical issues that can
be jointly concerned and approached through philosophical interpretation and from a
broader philosophical vantage point. (5) It emphasizes being open-ended and
adequately inclusive regarding various (eligible) perspectives from distinct approaches
in different traditions, being sensitive to dynamic development of an object of study and
thus the due coverage of eligible perspectives. (6) It emphasizes that the foregoing
engaging exploration needs to be guided by adequate methodological principles in a
holistic way and with a higher and broader vision.
The substantial development of the constructive-engagement strategy of
comparative philosophy consists of, and lies in, its theoretic exploration and its
reflective practice that is to implement and realize the foregoing closely related
theoretic emphases; the relation between its theoretic exploration and its reflective
practice can be, and actually is (a fact to be addressed below), mutually supportive and
enhanced: on the one hand, the former is to provide a theoretic foundation, general
methodological guidance, and strategic direction for the latter; on the other hand, the
latter is not only to test the explanatory potency of the former but also provides further
justification through evidence as explanans and further details of some theoretic points
made in the former or even enhance the former by bringing about relevant new theoretic
points and thus opening up some new fronts of theoretic exploration.
Three notes are due at this point. First, exactly how to label this strategic goal and
methodological strategy of cross-tradition engagement in philosophy is relatively
6

For this author’s detailed examination of this, see section 0.2.2 in Mou 2020.
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unimportant; one can label it in some other ways that one would reasonably prefer. The
methodological strategy is characterized in terms of ‘constructive engagement’ with
two major considerations: <1> the key words in the phrase (‘constructive’ and
‘engagement’) and the whole phrase literally capture some of its crucial features and
emphases; <2> the label has been historically associated with the strategy both in
relevant documents in print (for example, the previously cited passages from the
mission statements of this journal and the CPWP Constitution) and in the reflective
practice of the “constructive-engagement” strategy (especially in the past two decades)
through a range of international collective projects that have been guided by the
strategy (such as the collective research projects entitled ‘Davidson’s Philosophy and
Chinese Philosophy’, ‘Constructive Engagement of Analytic and Continental
Approaches in Philosophy: From the Vantage Point of Comparative Philosophy’ and
‘Philosophy of Language, Chinese Language, Chinese Philosophy: Constructive
Engagement’).
Second, similar to the case of comparative philosophy as a general way of doing
philosophy through cross-tradition engagement toward world philosophy that is open
to distinct theoretic elaborations in distinct terms, the addressed constructiveengagement strategic account of comparative philosophy is also open to distinct
theoretic elaborations in distinct terms or with distinct focuses with distinct emphases.
The point here is related to the foregoing fifth emphasis to the effect that the
“constructive-engagement” strategy as characterized above is open-ended and
inclusive and is thus understood broadly to this extent: on the one hand, these key terms
in the foregoing six emphasis connections (as highlighted in italics above) are
constructively open to distinct explanations that are within their due conceptual rooms
and could be compatible or even complementary; on the other hand, such inclusiveness
certainly does not mean “anything goes” but needs to healthily maintain due restrictions
and reasonable normative bases, although such due restrictions and reasonable
normative bases per se need to be critically and justifiably identified and specified. To
this extent, the constructive-engagement strategy can and does cover, directly or
indirectly, explicitly or implicitly, many specific cross-tradition engagement projects
and some distinct theoretic accounts that would be more or less in line with the
“constructive-engagement” strategy to explore the general issue of how cross-tradition
engagement in philosophy is possible. The list can include those theoretic accounts that
take a type of unifying pluralist approach and are thus more in line with the
constructive-engagement orientation; it can also (more or less) cover some of variants
(if not all of them) of the pragmatist approach (type) that can be more or less in line
with the constructive-engagement strategy, though they sometimes do not appear so.7
Indeed, as far as philosophical inquiries that are kindred in spirit with the constructiveengagement strategy are concerned, historically speaking, the reflective practice that
explicitly or implicitly takes the constructive-engagement strategy in doing philosophy
7

For a further analysis of how the constructive-engagement strategy is related with some other theoretic
accounts of the unifying pluralist approach and some variants of the pragmatist approach (type), see Mou
2020, section 0.1 (for their references, see endnotes 3 and 4 of chapter 1).
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comparatively is not new; the theoretic endeavor intended to more or less explain some
of the involved methodological emphases is not new either. However, remarkably in
the past two decades (especially since the beginning of this century), there have come
out more research works that are more explicitly in the direction of the constructiveengagement strategy (especially in the areas of moral philosophy and socio-political
philosophy 8 ). In this way, I treat my own comprehensive theoretic account of the
constructive-engagement strategy as given in my recent monograph book as one
theoretic elaboration of the constructive-engagement strategic account, instead of the
exclusive one.9 It is a constructive sign that some of these previous theoretic endeavors
in explaining the constructive-engagement strategy has positively impacted on some
other scholars’ innovative contributions to the scholarship in doing philosophy
comparatively both at the meta-methodological theoretic level and at the level of crosstradition engaging examination of some specific topics.10
Three, the constructive-engagement strategy of comparative philosophy is neither
merely arm-chair contemplation nor just imagined conjecture; especially since the
beginning of this century, one prominent significant feature in the development of the
constructive-engagement strategy of comparative philosophy lies in the close
connection between its theoretic exploration and its reflective practice, instead of either
developing alone. As indicated above, the substantial development of the constructiveengagement strategy of comparative philosophy consists of its theoretic exploration
and its reflective practice that is to implement and realize the foregoing closely related
theoretic emphases, because the relation between its theoretic exploration and its
reflective practice can be mutually supportive and enhanced. The actual substantial
development of the constructive-engagement strategy of comparative philosophy in the
past two decades has well verified this. Among others, some prominent and substantial
collective efforts both in theory and in reflective practice have been made on a range
of jointly concerned issues in various areas of philosophy explicitly in the direction of
the constructive-engagement strategy;11 a range of research articles on the track of the
constructive-engagement strategy have been published in the journal Comparative
Philosophy since 2010.12
The last note above addresses the constructive-engagement-oriented worldwide
efforts in theory and reflective practice in their combined and mutually enhanced way,
which points to world philosophy, given that world philosophy in its full sense consists
of both general theoretic guidance in cross-tradition engagement and worldwide
8

For sample cases of this kind and their brief analyses, see Mou 2020, section 0.1 (for their references,
see endnote 6 of chapter 1).
9
See Mou 2020 with its subtitle as ‘A Constructive-Engagement Account’, by which I mean what is
given in the book is only one account of such a “constructive-engagement” kind.
10
See some good examples that have been published in this journal, whose contents are open-accessible
at this journal’s website <www.comparativephilosophy.org>.
11
These collective research anthology volumes include a range of anthology volumes edited by some
other scholars and the anthology volume of which I am contributing editor (or co-editor) and which
explicitly go with the constructive-engagement orientation: for their references, see endnote 7 of chapter
1 in Mou 2020.
12
See many articles published in this journal.
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reflective practice. This is not accidental or happens to be the case. Rather, the
constructive-engagement strategy of comparative philosophy intrinsically points to a
vision of world philosophy that is a forward-looking, dynamic, and multiple-layered
process of development of philosophy worldwide (thus “toward world philosophy”).
World philosophy of such a kind can be highlighted in the following distinct but
complementary connections (neither exhaustive nor exclusive but open-ended) in
theory and reflective practice. <1> As far as its due coverage is concerned, it is
worldwide covering distinct approaches from different traditions worldwide [via
Features (2) and (3)]. <2> As far as its philosophical character is concerned, it is critical
in character and requires justification understood broadly [via Features (1), (2), (3) and
(5)]. <3> As far as its joint-starting-point connection is concerned, various jointly
concerned issues/topics constitute a range of joint starting points of cross-tradition
engagement [via Feature (4)]. <4> As far as its constructive and unifying ending point
is concerned, it emphasizes the dialogue and mutual understanding of distinct
approaches and resources from different traditions, their learning from and engaging
with each other, and their make joint contributions in a constructive-engaging way or
an overall complementary way to the development of philosophy worldwide [via
Features (2) and (4)]. <5> As far as its dynamic character is concerned, it points to a
thorough open-minded attitude and open-ended character that are sensitive to the
dynamic development of the worldwide situation. [via Feature (5)]. <6> As far as the
methodological-guiding-principle dimension of such worldwide philosophical
enterprise is concerned, it points to a range of “adequacy” conditions for maintaining
adequate methodological guiding principles (concerning how to look at the due
relationship between distinct approaches/resources from different traditions) in a
strategic holistic way [via Feature (6)].
Among these connections of the addressed “world philosophy” toward which
constitutes the “direction” dimension of comparative philosophy, the six one is last but
not least: a holistic command of “adequacy” conditions for maintaining adequate
methodological guiding principles with a higher and broader vision, which is
emphasized by the constructive-engagement strategy, is crucial in guiding the
constructive-engagement-oriented worldwide efforts of comparative philosophy
toward world philosophy. This point will be further elaborated in the next section.
3. A HOLISTIC COMMAND OF “ADEQUACY” CONDITIONS
FOR METHODOLOGICAL GUIDING PRINCIPLES:
TOWARD WORLD PHILOSOPHY
In the preceding sections, a general explanation of the identity of comparative
philosophy as a general way of doing philosophy through cross-tradition engagement
toward world philosophy is made in section 1, and then a general characterization of
the “constructive-engagement” strategic account of comparative philosophy toward
world philosophy is given in section 2, both of which are open to distinct theoretic
elaborations. In this section, I further elaborate the ending point that is made at the end
of the previous section, i.e., a holistic command (understanding and characterization)

Comparative Philosophy 13.2 (2022)

MOU

13

of “adequacy” conditions for maintaining adequate methodological guiding principles
with a higher and broader vision is crucial both in working out the constructiveengagement strategic account and in guiding the constructive-engagement-oriented
worldwide efforts of comparative philosophy toward world philosophy. My strategy in
this section is this. First, based on my recent writings on this topic,13 I briefly present
an enhanced version of a holistic account of “adequacy” conditions for maintaining
adequate methodological principles and thus a meta-methodological framework of how
cross-tradition engagement is possible, which constitutes one central part of this
author’s theoretic elaboration of the “constructive-engagement” strategy of
comparative philosophy; second, I then explain how the holistic vision of this suggested
meta-methodological framework of how cross-tradition engagement is possible
explicitly points to the “direction” dimension of comparative philosophy as a general
way of doing philosophy through cross-tradition engagement toward world philosophy.
3.1

A HOLISTIC ACCOUNT OF “ADEQUACY” CONDITIONS
FOR METHODOLOGICAL GUIDING PRINCIPLES

As highlighted above, the constructive-engagement strategy of comparative philosophy
emphasizes being guided by adequate methodological principles in a holistic way and
with a higher and broader vision, which points to and brings about the holistic character
of world philosophy. In the past decades, I have suggested, explained and kept refining
a theoretic account of adequacy conditions for how to maintain adequate
methodological guiding principles in looking at the due relationship between distinct
(eligible) methodological perspectives (given an object of study), due to the openended character of such a set of adequacy conditions and being sensitive to the
substantial development of the constructive-engagement scholarship. In the following,
a most recent version of this theoretic account is briefly presented after some
conceptual/explanatory resources are introduced.
This account needs some conceptual/explanatory resources and their lexical
distinctions for a clear and concise characterization which are briefly given here.14
Given that the term ‘method’ or ‘methodological approach’ means a way of responding
to how to approach an object of study, there is the distinction between three kinds of
ways or methods, which might constitute three distinct dimensions of a methodological
approach. (1) A methodological perspective (or perspective method): a way
approaching an object of study that is intended to point to or focus on a certain aspect
of the object and capture or explain the aspect in terms of the characteristics of that
aspect, together with the minimal metaphysical commitment that there is that aspect of
the object. There is the important distinction between eligible and ineligible
methodological perspectives: given an object of study, a (methodological) perspective
on the object that does capture a certain aspect really possessed by the object is eligible
13

The “Conclusion” chapter of Mou 2020 and Mou 2022.
These conceptual and explanatory resources and their associated distinctions were first introduced and
explained in Mou 2001. For a recent refined account of them, see section 0.2.3 of Mou 2020.

14
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(otherwise it would be ineligible). There is also the distinction between a
methodological-perspective simplex and a methodological-perspective complex: a
simplex is a single discernible methodological perspective, and a complex is either a
combination of multiple simplexes (multiple perspective complex) or an association of
one perspective simplex with a certain methodological guiding principle (guidingprinciple-associated perspective complex). (By ‘perspective’ I mean a methodologicalperspective simplex unless indicated otherwise.) (2) A methodological instrument (or
instrumental method): a way in which to implement, or give tools to realize, a certain
methodological perspective. They are largely neutral in character and serve for
different methodological perspectives, though there is the distinction between more and
less effective ones on a certain perspective. (3) A methodological guiding principle (or
guiding-principle method): a way concerning a certain methodological perspective(s)
regarding an object of study, which is presupposed by the agent who takes that
perspective (or one or more among the group of the perspectives) for the sake of
guiding and regulating <1> how the general purpose and specific focus that the
perspective serves should be set; <2> how the current perspective should be evaluated
and used, <3> how to look at the relation between the current perspective and other
perspectives. [The above <2> and <3> are combined into “how to look at the relation
between distinct methodological perspectives regarding an object of study”]. There is
the important distinction between adequate and inadequate methodological guiding
principles concerning how to look at the relation between distinct methodological
perspective(s) regarding an object of study.
There are three quite straightforward morals here. First, the merit and status of one’s
methodological perspective per se can be evaluated independently of certain (adequate
or inadequate) methodological guiding principles that one might presuppose in one’s
actual application of the perspective. [One implied point of this moral is this: taking a
bad (inadequate) guiding principle does not imply assuming a bad (ineligible)
perspective.] Second, the reflective practice per se of one’s taking a certain
methodological perspective as one’s working perspective implies neither that one loses
sight of other genuine aspects of the object nor that one ignores or rejects other eligible
perspectives in one’s background thinking. [One implied point of this moral is this:
taking a limited (finite and one-sided) perspective does not imply assuming a bad
(inadequate) guiding principle.] Third, on the other hand, it does matter whether and
how one is adequately guided in evaluating the status of one’s own working perspective
and some other perspectives and their relationship and in applying one’s working
perspective.
A most recent version of the addressed holistic account of adequacy conditions for
maintaining adequate methodological principles is briefly presented below.15
15

Historically speaking, being sensitive and in response to the substantial development of comparative
philosophy as a general way of doing philosophy through cross-tradition engagement, the addressed
account of adequacy conditions has undergone its development via three major stages, which are
presented respectively in Mou 2001, 2010 and 2020. In Mou 2001, four adequacy conditions are
implicitly suggested through some distinct sample cases (see pages 354-363); in Mou 2010, six adequacy
conditions are explicitly presented and explained (see section 2.4). In Mou 2020, eleven adequacy
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(1) The adequacy condition of recognizing the same object as a whole (‘the sameobject-whole-recognizing condition’ for short): A methodological guiding principle is
considered adequate (in this connection) if, given an object of study, it enables the agent
to recognize that there is a way that the object objectively is such that it is not the case
that “anything goes”, and people can all talk about that same object as a whole even
though they may say different things about the object (concerning its distinct aspects),
neither resulting in “anything goes” nor thus bringing about radically different objects
on their own. In contrast, it is considered inadequate (in this connection) if otherwise.
This adequacy condition may be called the normative “way-thing-are-capturing”
condition in the sense that it is presupposed by the remaining types of adequacy
conditions for the sake of capturing the way the object is (or is to be) if the truth pursuit
is one strategic goal.
(2) The adequacy condition of recognizing perspective eligibility (‘the perspectiveeligibility-recognizing condition’ for short): A methodological guiding principle that is
presupposed by the agent who uses some eligible methodological perspective as her
current working perspective is considered to be adequate when this guiding principle
renders other eligible methodological perspectives (if any) also eligible and somehow
compatible with the application of the current working perspective. In contrast, it is
considered inadequate in this connection if otherwise. It is noted that, in comparison
with the subsequent adequacy conditions, this adequacy condition may be called a
‘minimal’ condition in the sense that it is to be minimally presupposed (or pursued) by
the subsequent types of adequacy conditions and that this adequacy condition is
minimally needed by any adequate methodological guiding principle.
(3) The adequacy condition of being sensitive to the agent purpose (‘the agentpurpose-sensitivity condition’ for short): A methodological guiding principle is
considered to be adequate if it has its choice of a certain working perspective, among
eligible methodological perspectives, sensitive to the agent’s purpose and focus and
thus renders the most applicable or the most appropriate (the best relative to that
purpose) the perspective that (best) serves that purpose. In contrast, it is considered
inadequate in this connection if otherwise.
(4) The adequacy condition of granting equality status (‘the equality-statusgranting condition’ for short): A methodological guiding principle is considered to be
adequate if it renders all the eligible methodological perspectives (perspective
simplexes) equal: being equally partial and being equally needed for the sake of a
complete account of an object of study, though one eligible perspective can be rendered
more needed or in focus than others only relative to its associated purpose; thus none
of them absolutely superior (or inferior) to the others in the above senses. In contrast,
it is considered inadequate in this connection if otherwise.
(5) The adequacy condition of recognizing new eligible perspectives (‘the neweligible-perspective-possibility-recognizing condition’ for short): A methodological
guiding principle is considered to be adequate if it takes an open-minded attitude
conditions are explicitly presented and explained (see “Conclusion” chapter). The full text of the current
twelve-condition account is presented and explained in Mou 2022.
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towards the possibility of a new eligible perspective concerning an object of study that
is to point to some genuine aspect of the object but has yet to be realized by the agent
because of the ‘unknown-identity’ status of that aspect. A methodological guiding
principle is considered inadequate in this connection if otherwise.
(6) The adequacy condition of being sensitive to dynamic development of an object
of study and thus the due coverage of eligible perspectives (‘the dynamic developmentsensitivity condition’ for short): A methodological guiding principle is considered
adequate (in this connection) if it guides the agent to be sensitive to the dynamic
development (if any) of an object of study for the sake of realizing and understanding
which aspects are (still or currently) genuinely possessed by the object and thus which
methodological perspectives are still eligible, on the one hand, and which previous
aspects are lost and thus which previous perspectives not currently eligible anymore,
on the other hand. In contrast, it is considered inadequate (in this connection) if
otherwise.
(7) The adequacy condition of capturing concordant complementarity (‘the
concordant complementarity-capturing condition’ for short): Given that multiple
distinct yet eligible methodological perspectives concerning an object of study turn out
to be (or able to be) mutually supportive and supplementary in a manifest consistent
way (thus called ‘concordantly complementary’), a methodological guiding principle
is considered adequate (in this connection) if it guides the agent to capture (or seek and
promote) such concordant complementarity of these perspectives for the sake of their
working together and make joint contribution. In contrast, it is considered inadequate
(in this connection) if otherwise.
(8) The adequacy contradiction of capturing restrictive complementarity (‘the
restrictive-complementarity-capturing condition’ for short): Given that there are two
(multiple) different methodological perspectives concerning an object of study which
are eligible (i.e., capturing distinct aspects of the object) but which are genuinely
contradictory (i.e., the captured distinct aspects are genuine internal contradictory
aspects possessed by the object) and that this object with its internal contradictory
constituent aspects exists still in a constructive way (rather than in destructive tension
up to sublation), a methodological guiding principle would be considered adequate (in
this connection) if it guides the agent to <1> recognize the genuinely contradictory state
of the involved aspects of the object and thus the eligibility of these “contradictory”
perspectives that capture these aspects, and <2> capture
the “restrictive”
complementarity of these contradictory yet eligible perspectives with their recessive
mutual support for the sake of a complete understanding of the complete identity of the
object. In contrast, it is considered inadequate (in this connection) if otherwise.
(9) The adequacy condition of seeking sublation and post-sublation
complementarity (‘the post-sublation-complementarity-seeking condition’ for short):
Given that two (or more than two) seemingly competing contraries as a whole (say,
two contrary approaches to a jointly-concerned issue, either one of which or both are
“guiding-principle-associated perspective complexes) somehow cannot be mutually
supportive and supplementary (neither in a manifest way nor in a recessive way) and
need their sublation (understood broadly, to be explained below) so that reasonable and
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valuable elements need to be sublated respectively from the two contraries and
incorporated into a new unity and that they can be mutually supportive and
supplementary (either in a concordant way or in a restrictive way), a methodological
guiding principle is considered adequate if it guides the agent to <1> sublates these
reasonable and valuable elements from the two original contraries, incorporates them
into a new unity as new contraries and <2> understand and capture their post-sublation
complementarity (in a concordant or restrictive way). In contrast, it is considered
inadequate (in this connection) if otherwise.
(10) The adequacy condition of overcoming excessiveness and achieving
constructive balance (‘the excessiveness-overcoming condition’ for short): Given that
there are multiple distinct yet eligible methodological perspectives concerning an
object of study which are mutually supportive and thus complementary, whether in a
manifest way (thus concordantly complementary) or in a recessive way (thus
restrictively complementary) and whether such a complementarity is achieved directly
by recognition or indirectly through sublation, a methodological guiding principle is
considered adequate (in this connection) if it guides the agent to maintain alreadyachieved complementarity by overcoming what is excessive (if any) and supplementing
what is insufficient (if any) in treating these distinct eligible perspectives and thus
bringing about their constructive balance (either in the form of “concordant” or
“harmonious” balance for concordant complementarity or in the form of “restrictive”
balance for restrictive complementarity). In contrast, it is considered inadequate (in this
connection) if otherwise.
(11) The adequacy condition of holding a thorough open-minded and self-critical
attitude towards the agent’s own approach (‘The open-mind-oriented self-criticism
condition’ for short): A methodological guiding principle is considered adequate (in
this connection) if it guides the agent to have a thorough open-minded and self-critical
attitude towards the agent’s own approach. In contrast, it is considered inadequate (in
this connection) if otherwise.
(12) The adequacy condition of holding an overall-holistic vision that coordinates
the preceding adequacy conditions in distinct connections into a whole and captures
the due relationship between them (‘the overall-holistic-vision-capturing condition’ for
short): A methodological guiding principle is considered adequate (in this overallholistic connection) if, given an object of study, it guides the agent to strive for a (more)
complete understanding of various aspects of the object together with its intrinsically
related normative bases, its relevant background, and its possible development and thus
have an overall-holistic vision that reflectively coordinates the preceding metamethodological adequacy conditions [(1) through (10)] in distinct connections into a
whole and captures the due relationship between them. In contrast, it is considered
inadequate (in this connection) if otherwise.
Though “adequate” condition (12) is the last one, it is not least. If the preceding
adequacy conditions (1) through (10) are meta-philosophical in nature, this adequacy
condition, like the adequacy condition (11), is meta-meta-methodological in nature
because it is about how to look at these meta-methodological adequacy conditions. This
adequacy condition is significant in the sense to be explained in the next subsection.
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Three notes are due here. First, to the extent and in the sense as explained before,
given an object of study, the adequacy condition (1) (i.e., the same-object-wholerecognizing condition) is meta-methodological due to the “presupposition” relation
between the adequacy condition (1) together with the adequacy condition (2) and the
other meta-methodological adequacy conditions (3) through (10) on how to look at the
relation between various (methodological) perspectives; in this way, the apparent
holistic character of the adequacy conditions (1) and (2) is thus at the metamethodological level. In contrast, the overall-holistic-vision-holding condition is
overall-holistic in character at the meta-meta-methodological level, which is to guide
the agent to see (say) the previously addressed intrinsic relation between the adequacy
condition (1) and the two normative bases in cross-tradition engagement in philosophy,
the “presupposition” relation between the adequacy condition (1) and the other metamethodological adequacy conditions (2) through (10), etc.
Second, in the previous presentations of some of those preceding “adequacy”
conditions (1) through (10), some meta-meta-methodological remarks regarding their
status and relations with some other adequacy conditions have been made, though these
remarks are not parts of these adequacy conditions per se; rather, they are actually
implied parts of the overall-holistic vision addressed in the current overall-holisticvision-holding condition.
Three, the overall-holistic-vision-holding condition and the open-mind-oriented
self-criticism condition are intrinsically complementary. On the one hand, the
addressed open-minded self-criticism attitude needs to closely work with the holistic
condition as one solid compass: one’s being open-minded does not mean no direction
but needs to go with the aid of a holistic vision of a due direction, due coverages/limits
of the preceding meta-methodological adequacy conditions in distinct connections, and
how to across boundaries. On the other hand, a holistic vision does not mean
indiscriminate inclusion; rather, a holistic vision in philosophy intrinsically points to a
reflective or self-critical attitude toward itself. To this extent, the two meta-metamethodological adequacy conditions are mutually supportive, supplementary, and
interpenetrating. They are thus complementary in jointly guiding and regulating how
to look at the preceding adequacy conditions. It is arguably correct that, more generally
speaking, the adequate conditions (11) and (12), an open-to-criticism attitude and a
holistic vision, actually constitute two distinct but complementary trade-mark features
of the adequate guidance for any philosophical exploration.
With the joint guidance of the adequacy conditions (11) and (12), one substantial
point regarding the set of meta-methodological adequacy conditions is this: any
condition on the meta-methodological “adequacy-condition” list per se is open to
criticism, instead of being dogmatically imposed, and should be guided in an overallholistic vision. Indeed, the set of meta-methodological adequacy conditions (1) through
(10) have been suggested to serve two purposes. For one thing, it is to explain how it
is possible to have adequate methodological guiding principles in cross-tradition
philosophical inquiries. For another thing, it is to provide readers with an engaging
starting point or an effective stepping stone, which per se is not intended to be
dogmatically imposed on readers but expected to be a target of critical examination in
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their own reflective explorations of the issue. The set of adequacy conditions (1)
through (10) are thus open-ended with an overall-holistic-vision guidance in two
connections: first, any of these adequacy conditions per se is open to be further
criticized, modified, or enhanced; second, this set of adequacy condition is open to be
further expanded to cover more well-established ones if in need.
3.2

COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY TOWARD WORLD PHILOSOPHY:
AN OVERALL-HOLISTIC VISION OF ADEQUACY CONDITIONS

Comparative philosophy as a general way of doing philosophy through cross-tradition
engagement, when holistically guided by adequate methodological guiding principles
in various relevant connections, is essentially a general way of doing philosophy
toward world philosophy. The reason is this.
For one thing, one crucial characteristic feature of world philosophy lies in its
intrinsic holistic vision that is somehow to bring together distinct approaches/resources
from different traditions and unify them in an overall complementary way. For another
thing, a constructive-engagement-oriented account of adequacy conditions for how to
maintain adequate methodological guiding principles is expected to be holistic at the
two levels. First, given an object of study, at the meta-methodological level regarding
how to look at the due relationship between distinct eligible methodological
perspectives that are to respectively capture distinct aspects of the object, a holistic
treatment of such various distinct eligible (methodological) perspectives is expected.
The adequacy conditions (1) through (10) as a whole, especially through the adequacy
conditions (1) [i.e., the same-object-whole-recognizing condition] and (2) [i.e., the
perspective-eligibility-recognizing condition] that are more or less presupposed by the
others, presents such a holistic character at the meta-methodological level.
Second, at the meta-meta-methodological level regarding how to look at the due
relationship between distinct meta-methodological adequacy conditions, a holistic
vision is also expected. Let me employ a sample case for illustration. It might be the
case that one takes an adequate methodological guiding principle in one connection
(i.e., meeting one adequacy condition) but fails to do so in another connection (i.e.,
failing to meet another adequacy condition): for example, given an object of study, one
might adopt a methodological guiding principle that meets, say the “agent-purposesensitivity” condition but fails to meet, say, the “new-eligible-perspective-possibilityrecognizing” condition. The constructive sentiment and expectation for the agent is to
strive for a (more) complete understanding of various aspects of the object together
with its relevant background so that the agent can have a holistic vision that reflectively
coordinates the preceding adequacy conditions in distinct connections into a whole and
recognizes the due relationship between them. The overall holistic vision and
expectation is explicitly captured by the adequacy condition (12) [i.e., the overallholistic-vision-capturing condition] together with the adequacy condition (11) [i.e., the
open-mind-oriented self-criticism condition] at the meta-meta-methodological level.
Through its overall-holistic character, the adequacy condition (12) explicitly points to
and contributes to the “direction” dimension (“toward world philosophy”) of
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comparative philosophy (as a general way of doing philosophy through cross-tradition
engagement toward world philosophy).
As shown above, I call an “overall holistic account” a constructive-engagementoriented account of adequacy conditions that explicitly and emphatically addresses the
foregoing distinct types of holistic character at the meta-meta-methodological level as
well as at the meta-methodological level. It is noted that a constructive-engagementoriented account of adequacy conditions that does not explicitly addresses the
foregoing holistic character at the meta-meta-methodological level is still manifestly
holistic at the meta-methodological level, and such an account can be implicitly holistic
at the meta-meta-methodological level (thus implicitly overall holistic).16 In this way,
comparative philosophy as a general way of doing philosophy through cross-tradition
engagement, when guided by an (explicitly or implicitly) overall holistic account of
adequacy conditions for adequate methodological guiding principles in various
relevant connections, is essentially a general way of doing philosophy toward world
philosophy. In other words, a holistic account of adequacy conditions on “how crosstradition engagement is possible” is essentially a holistic account of adequacy condition
on “how cross-tradition engagement toward world philosophy is possible”.
*

*

*

In sum, in this theme essay for the addressed special-theme section in this special issue
of the journal Comparative Philosophy, I have given an elaboration of the theme
“comparative philosophy as a general way of doing philosophy through cross-tradition
engagement toward world philosophy” (‘comparative philosophy toward world
philosophy’ for short), which has been explicitly presented and formally stated through
its recent academic-organizational channel CPWP and focused on recently by the
CPWP’s and this journal’s co-organized international conference. Although all of its
three dimensions (i.e., its “character” dimension as “a general way of doing
philosophy”, its “approach” dimension as “cross-tradition engagement”, and its
“direction” dimension as “toward world philosophy”) had been more or less suggested
and explained before in an explicit or implicit way, the theme “comparative philosophy
toward world philosophy” as a whole marks a momentous accumulating point of the
significant development of comparative philosophy as a general way of doing
philosophy through cross-tradition engagement regarding its “direction” dimension,
through the constructive-engagement strategy in theoretic exploration and reflective
practice especially since the beginning of this century. In section 1, I have given a
general explanation of the identity of comparative philosophy under examination in
this essay, which is essentially a general way of doing philosophy through cross16

So to speak, in the above senses, the suggested version of the constructive-engagement-oriented
account of adequacy conditions suggested in Mou 2020 [covering “adequacy” conditions (1) through
(11)] is implicitly overall holistic, while the suggested version in Mou 2022 which explicitly identified
and explained “adequacy” condition (12) [i.e., the overall-holistic-vision-capturing condition] is
explicitly overall holistic.
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tradition engagement toward world philosophy (whether all of its dimensions are
explicitly or implicitly given, and no matter how it is labeled), as theoretically explored
and reflectively practiced through a range of collective and individual research projects
especially since the beginning of this century and via the journal Comparative
Philosophy since its inception in 2010. In section 2, I have focused on one
representative “constructive-engagement” strategy of comparative philosophy as
emphasized by this journal and the CPWP, highlighting its emphases; among others, I
have explained how its substantial development intrinsically points to a vision of world
philosophy that is a forward-looking, dynamic, and multiple-layered process of
development of philosophy worldwide (thus “toward world philosophy”), which
demands a holistic guidance of adequate methodological guiding principles. In section
3, by presenting a most recent account of adequacy conditions for how to adequately
maintain methodological guiding pirniciples and analyzing its overall holistic character,
I have explained why and how a holistic command of “adequacy” conditions for
maintaining adequate methodological guiding principles with a higher and broader
vision is crucial both in working out the constructive-engagement strategic account and
in guiding the constructive-engagement-oriented worldwide efforts of comparative
philosophy toward world philosophy.
With these ideas explained in this essay in the first part of this special-theme section
on the theme, in the following second part of this special-theme section that presents
and evaluates the addressed illustrating cases of cross-tradition engagement worldwide,
the authors of the three essays, Nevad Kahteran (2022), Joseph Kaipayil (2022), and
Hongyin Zhou & Jiabin YE (2022), respectively give their reflective observations and
thoughtful evaluative analyses of the situations of doing philosophy comparatively in
three different regions of the world, respectively Southern Europe, Indian, and China,
with their distinct focuses. Their essays well show how distinct approaches from some
representative philosophical traditions in each of these regions can constructively talk
to, engage with, and learn from each other and make their joint contributions to the
development of philosophy on a range of shared concerns and topics toward world
philosophy.
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